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The practice of adopting adults, even if one has biological children, makes Japanese family firms unusually
competitive. Our nearly population-wide panel of postwar listed nonfinancial firms shows inherited
family firms more important in postwar Japan than generally realized, and also performing well –
an unusual finding for a developed economy. Adopted heirs’ firms outperform blood heirs’ firms,
and match or nearly match founder-run listed firms. Both adopted and blood heirs’ firms outperform
non-family firms. Using family structure variables as instruments, we find adopted heirs “causing”
elevated performance. These findings are consistent with adult adoptees displacing blood heirs in the
left tail of the talent distribution, with the “adopted son” job motivating star managers, and with the
threat of displacement inducing blood heirs to invest in human capital, mitigating the so-called “Carnegie
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You can’t choose your sons, but you can choose your sons-in-law. 
Adage explaining why Japanese business 
families rejoice at the birth of a girl1 
1.  Introduction 
If  talent  and  intelligence  were  reliably  inherited,  biologically  or  environmentally,  family  firms 
should  dominate  economic  activity.  However,  such  traits  are,  at  most,  unreliably  passed  along 
(Herrnstein and Murray 1994; Heckman1995). Moreover, restricting the top job to family truncates 
non-family executives’ career options, inducing an adverse selection problem in the hiring and 
retention of outsiders (Aronoff and Ward 2000) and limiting the efficacy of CEO tournaments in 
eliciting lower-level executives’ effort (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Demsetz 1996; Frank and Cook 
1996).  Perhaps  most  damning,  the  US  Gilded  Age  tycoon  Andrew  Carnegie  (1899)  famously 
conjectures  that  inherited  wealth  “generally  deadens  the  talents  and  energies”  –  a  premise 
supported in US tax data (Holtz-Eakin et al. 1993). Given this threefold competitive disadvantage, 
the wisdom of the Chinese proverb “wealth shall not pass to a third generation” follows.  
  The benefits of entrusting corporate governance to business families are less definitive. 
Theses  that  family  firms  excel  at  long-term  thinking  or  lessen  agency  conflicts  lack  empirical 
support (Bertrand and Schoar 2006). Rather, the evidence suggests that family control is a feasible 
second best solution around dysfunctional institutions, such as weak shareholder rights (La Porta 
et al. 1999; Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer 2003) or widespread corruption (Khanna and Palepu 
2000; Khanna and Rivkin 2001), which correlate strongly with families dominating big business (La 
Porta et al. 1999; Fogel 2007). Consistent with this, family firms generally perform better in less 
developed  economies  (Khanna  and  Yafeh  2007)  and  worse  in  more  developed  economies 
(Bennedsen et al. 2007; Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung 2005; Villalonga and Amit 2006).2  
  Japan is a high-income economy with well-developed institutions (La Porta et al. 1997), and 
its big businesses are generally described as professionally managed (Chandler 1977; Porter 1990). 
However,  using  a  panel of  nearly  all  nonfinancial  firms  listed  from 1949  (when  stock markets 
reopened) through 1970, and followed until 2000, we find inherited family control commonplace in 
large Japanese businesses. Moreover, we show firms controlled by heirs to outperform otherwise 
similar professionally managed firms. These results are highly robust and an analysis of succession 
events suggests family control “causes” good performance, rather than the converse.  
  To  explain  this  seeming  paradox,  we  highlight  two  unique  facts  about  Japanese  family 
businesses. First, business families in Japan continue to practice a form of arranged marriage called 
omiai  (lit.  arranged  seeing),  where  the  daughter  meets  an  approved  groom,  selected  by  the 
patriarch. Second, Japanese families may adopt adult sons if nature fails to provide a natural son, or 
provides  inadequate  ones.  Business  families  often  select  such  sons  from  among  their  most 
promising  top  managers  (Chen 2004). The “new”  son usually takes  the  family  name in  a  legal 
adoption process, swears allegiance to his new ancestors, and in most instances also marries a 
daughter of the current patriarch – hence the family business adage above. Remarkably, Edo and 
Osaka merchants traditionally celebrated a daughters’ birth with red rice to mark the creation of a 
new space for an adopted son-in-law (Morikawa 1992).  
                                                 
1   Referenced, with minor differences in wording, by Esaka (2001, p. 263-269), Nomura (2006, p. 134), and 
other major works on Japanese business families.  
2   For a counter example to this generalization, see Sraer and Thesmar (2007), who find that between 1994 
and 2000, family firms, including those run by descendents, outperform non-family firms listed on the Paris 
bourse. They attribute the superior performance of family firms to lower labor costs, perhaps stemming from 
a quid-pro-quo where family firms offer better job safety in return for lower wages.    3 
  Adult adoptions are the predominant form of adoption in Japan, but are vanishingly rare 
elsewhere in Asia and the West.3 This propensity to adopt highly successful adults, rather than 
needy children, evokes stiff rebuke from foreign researchers and child advocates alike.4  
  Adult adoption could invigorate Japanese family firms in several ways, which could explain 
their  persistence  and  prosperity.  First,  adult  adoptions  mitigate  the  suboptimal  succession 
problem: A family that draws an exceptionally untalented blood son can recover by adopting a 
highly talented professional manager as a new son. This necessarily attenuates the lower talent tail 
of observed heirs and broadens the upper tail. Second, unlike their peers in foreign family firms, 
Japanese professional executives can aim for the top job of “son”, a prize not normally considered in 
discussions of Western family firms. Finally, blood sons, knowing adopted adult sons can displace 
them, dare not let their talents and energies be deadened. Just as the threat of a hostile takeover, 
more  than  its  actual  occurrence  spurs  professional  managers  to  efficiency;  the  threat  of 
displacement by a “better” son may well allay the Carnegie conjecture.  
  We posit that these  efficiency-enhancing effects explain the incidence and prosperity of 
large  old-money  family  firms  in  postwar  Japan.  More  generally,  these  considerations  raise  the 
possibility that arranged marriage norms might help professionalize family firms in other countries, 
even absent adult adoptions. Consistent with this, Mehrotra et al. (2009) find sociological proxies 
for the incidence of arranged marriage highly positively correlated with the prevalence of family 
firms  across  countries.  Finally,  our  findings  linking  firm  performance  to  CEO  characteristics 
associated with talent complements work by Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bennedsen et al. (2010), 
and others linking management characteristics to firm policies and supports the basic theses that 
CEO talent – variously associated with unique creativity (Schumpeter 1911), rationality (Knight 
1921, c. 9), and foresight (Hayek (1941, 334) – is a scarce and valuable factor of production.   
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  section  2  describes  Japanese 
adoption practices and highlights their stark distinctions from those of other countries – Western 
and Asian. Section 3 describes our data and variables; and section 4 contains our empirical test 
results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  Family Firms and Japanese Traditions 
Differences  between  Japan  and  other  countries  are  easily  exaggerated.  However,  Japan 
unquestionably has a unique concept of adoption, and this provides a unique set of institutional 
constraints around family firms.  
 
2.1  Pitfalls of Dynastic Corporate Governance 
Inherited corporate governance is subject to three fundamental problems: heirs who do not inherit 
business  acumen,  truncated  career  incentives  for  non-family  executives,  and  heirs  whose 
upbringing renders them unqualified.  
  Leading a great business requires intelligence; though perhaps of a form different from the 
general intelligence measured by IQ tests. Business acumen may depend on social or emotional 
intelligence (Thorndike 1920; Payne 1983), and perhaps on other traits (Gardner 2007), any of 
                                                 
3   Adult adoptions were known in the ancient West. The “good emperors” – Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antonius 
Pius, and Marcus Aurelius – each an adopted son of his predecessor, ruled the Roman Empire from 96 to 180 
A.D. – its longest span of good government (Gibbon, 1776, bk. 1 c. 1). The era ended when the stoic 
philosopher, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, could not bear disinheriting his biological son, the eponymous 
Emperor Commodus, whose reign of terror ended with his assassination in 193 A.D.  
4   See e.g. Hayes and Habu (2006), who describe the effect of adoptions on child welfare as “questionable” in 
Japan.    4 
which may complement general intelligence (Cote and Miners 2006). Business acumen, like other 
human traits, is likely subject to “regression to the mean”. That is, outliers with extreme traits arise 
occasionally, but each successive generation of the family’s progeny averages ever closer to the 
global  population  mean  (Galton,  1886).  That  is,  general  intelligence  is,  at  most,  only  partially 
inherited (Herrnstein and Murray 1994; Heckman 1995; Devlin et al. 1997), so it seems implausible 
that business acumen would reliably run in families either.  
  Another  reason  for  positing  a  competitive  disadvantage  to  hereditary  corporate control 
arises from work arguing that the CEO labor market is efficient in offering high compensation 
premiums for slight edges in talent because this induces tournament competition for the top job 
(Lazear and Rosen 1981; Demsetz 1996). This is relevant for two reasons. First, a small edge in CEO 
talent, applied over the assets of a large firm, is plausibly an economically significant competitive 
advantage for the firm (Frank and Cook 1996). Second, a tournament to become CEO elicits effort 
from middle and lower-level executives who aspire to the top job.  Restricting the pool of CEO 
candidates to family should be costly on both counts: First, the most talented potential CEO in the 
family is unlikely to be better than the most talented potential CEO in the population (consistent 
with the model of family firms proposed by Burkart et al, 2003). Second, professional executives 
working for the family firm are not eligible for the tournament, and their effort is correspondingly 
lessened,  or  less  aligned  with  the  firm’s  prosperity  if  ambitious  executives  must  contemplate 
moving to a non-family firm to have a shot at the top job.5  
  A third reason for doubting the efficacy of dynastic corporate governance is the “Carnegie 
conjecture.” Arguing that the wealthy should bequeath their fortunes to schools, libraries, parks, 
music halls, and the like, the US steel tycoon Andrew Carnegie (1891) writes: “the parent who 
leaves his son enormous wealth generally deadens the talents and energies of the son, and tempts 
him to lead a less worthy and less useful life than he otherwise would.” Concluding that inherited 
wealth is destructive to both the heir and society, Carnegie argues that those who accumulate great 
fortunes have a duty to redistribute their wealth during their lifetimes to leave a legacy of elevated 
social welfare.  
  Empirical  studies  in  developed  economies  generally  find  heir-controlled  firms  to 
underperform significantly (Morck et al. 1988, 2000; Bertrand and Schoar 2006; Bennedsen et al. 
2007; Villalonga and Amit 2006; Miller et al. 2007; and others). Studies to the contrary generally 
use  extremely  broad  definitions  of  “family  firms”  (Bertrand  and  Schoar  2006)  –  for  example, 
Anderson  and  Reeb  (2003)  number  founder-controlled  firms  such  as  Berkshire  Hathaway  and 
Microsoft  among  “family  firms.”  Inherited  corporate  control  clearly  “causes”  depressed 
performance because firms’ share prices drop immediately upon news of the CEO job passing to an 
heir (Smith and Amoako-Adu 2005; Perez-Gonzalez 2006; and others). Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) 
find evidence supporting the “Carnegie conjecture” by inferring “deadening” from heirs’ US tax 
returns before and after receiving legacies. Business historians Landes (1949) and Chandler (1977) 
attribute some countries’ superior economic performance to their professionalized big business 
sectors outpacing economies still relying on family firms.  
Family  firms  in  developing  economies,  in  contrast,  often  exhibit  superior  performance 
(Khanna and Palepu 2000; Khanna and Rivkin 2001). This is attributed to a dearth of professional 
managers, family connections substituting for dysfunctional markets,  and the value of business 
families’ reputational capital (Khanna and Yafeh 2007); or to leading business families’ political 
connections (Morck et al. 2005). These findings, plus the more generally persistent dominance of 
very  large  family  firms  in  most  economies,  (La  Porta  et  al.  1999;  Landes  2006),  suggest  the 
                                                 
5   For example, Renault CEO Carlos Ghosn quit Michelin after it became clear a Michelin family member 
would supersede him to head the firm’s North American operations. He was with the firm for 18 years (see 
“Michelin Seeks Continuity after the Death of a Leader”, New York Times, May 29th, 2006.    5 
existence of solutions to the pitfalls of inherited corporate governance enumerated above.  
  The great Tokugawa era merchant families - the Mitsui and Sumitomo especially - found 
workable  solutions  to  these  problems  in  adoptions,  arranged  marriages,  and  both  (Morikawa 
1992). Horie (1966) explains that “It was common practice in old Japan to adopt a son from other 
families, without discrimination among relatives or non-relatives, and let him inherit the ie (house), 
not only when the ie lacked lineal heirs, but even in case the heir lacked the capacity needed to 
inherit the ie.” Kondo (1990) and Bhappu (2000) remark on the longevity of many Japanese family 
firms, and link this to the practice of bringing adopted heirs into family successions. The practices 
persist in our postwar sample: the following is but one of many examples.  
  Kajima Construction, one of the largest construction businesses in the world, is a family firm 
run  by  a  succession  of  adopted  heirs  for  three  generations.  Morinosuke  Kajima,  a  son-in-law 
adopted into the Kajima family, served as the first post-war CEO.6 He passed over his biological son 
to name his two adopted sons CEO and Chairman. Both married Kajima’s biological daughters. Only 
after the younger adopted son-in-law ascended from CEO to Chairman did Morinosuke’s biological 
son of serve as CEO – and then more briefly than either adopted son.  
Adoption as a form of executive compensation is (as far as we know) a uniquely Japanese 
practice and may differentiate its family businesses fundamentally from those in other countries. 
Indeed,  Chen  (2004)  argues  that  this  point  is  “crucial  to  understanding  the  differences  in 
ownership, organization, and management” of business groups in Japan and Korea. Certainly, the 
pay-for-performance dimension of becoming the next patriarch, and thus the steward of a vast 
family fortune, is not usually included as executive compensation (Kubo 2005).  
However, arranged marriages feature in family businesses in many countries (James 2006; 
Landes 2006). Becoming the patriarch’s son, and thus the next patriarch of a great family business, 
is  an  immense  reward  for  talent,  but  marrying  into  a  powerful  business  family  is  a  not 
inconsequential  reward  as  well.  Arranged  marriage  might  thus  also  help  attenuate  problems 
associated with the uncertain inheritance of talent, blunted incentives for talented professional 
managers, and even the Carnegie conjecture. Indeed, in many succession cases in Japan, a carefully 
arranged marriage may beget a suitable son-in-law to assume the role of the head of the house in a 
manner similar to an adopted son.7  
The general efficacy of arranged marriage in countering each of these problems is at present 
unknown. Moreover, where the spread of Western cultural norms replaces the traditional arranged 
marriage  with  “marriage  for  love”,  family  firms  ought  to  be  less  viable.  Consistent  with  this, 
Mehrotra et al. (2009) find family businesses to be more import in countries with higher scores on 
a set of sociological variables that they argue reflect the incidence of arranged marriages, and posit 
that  a secular decline in  arranged marriage  in many  countries  bodes ill  for  family firms  as  an 
organizational form.  
 
2.2  Japanese Adoption Practices 
Adoption  remains  common  in  modern  Japan.  Paulson  (1984)  reports  that  30%  of  her  survey 
respondents affirm that “an adoptee was among their relatives”. Comparative statistics are difficult 
because many countries keep adoptions confidential, but Yamahata (1977) estimates adoption far 
more popular in modern Japan than in any other country, with the possible exception of the United 
States.  
  Moreover, Japanese adoptions retain a distinctly mercantile ethos. While most U.S. adoptees 
                                                 
6   The Japanese term shacho is variously translated as president or CEO. We adopt the latter throughout.  
7     Japanese adoption-cum-marriage is perhaps an extreme variant of matrilocal marriage, wherein married 
couples reside with or near the wife’s family.  Qing dynasty uxorilocal marriage let a son-in-law take the 
family name of a sonless couple; but carried a severe social stigma (Lu 1998).     6 
are children, Japanese adoptees are overwhelmingly adults. Based on the 2003 U.S. Census Bureau, 
2.5% of all U.S. children in 2000 were adopted, possibly the highest rate in the world. In 2000 alone, 
over 127,000 adoptions or 31.4 adoptions per 1000 births were recorded in the U.S. (Bernal et al. 
2007; U.S. Census Bureau 2003). Excluding step-parent adoptions, Moriguchi (2010) estimates that 
in 2000 there were 20.4 child adoptions per 1000 births in the U.S., compared to only 1.6 child 
adoptions per 1000 births in Japan in the same year. Of the 80,790 adoptions reported in Japan in 
2000, only 1,356 were of children; and of these 362 were by grandparents or step-parents. The 
other 79,434 adoptions, 98% of the total, were of adults by adults.  
  Since  1988,  the  law  permits  two  forms  of  adoption  (yôshi).8 One  form,  special adoption 
(tokubetsu yôshi), resembles Western practices, and permanently transfers a child younger than six 
(eight  in  certain  foster  care  cases)  to  adoptive  parents.  This  new,  imported,  and  rarely  used 
procedure severs all legal links between the child and its biological parents, and is designed to 
advance the welfare of a needy child (Hayes and Habu 2006). Japanese courts approve only a few 
hundred each year: 521, 362, and 350 in 1995, 2000, and 2002, respectively.9  
  The traditional form, now called ordinary adoption (yôshi engumi or fûtsu yôshi), remains far 
more common. The adoptee is usually an adult male who, in return for an inheritance, agrees to 
carry forward the adopting family’s name. Both parties to the adoption transaction must be over 
fifteen,  the  age  of  consent,  or  court  approval  is  required  –  except  for  adoptions  of  one’s 
grandchildren or step-children (Civil Code §798). The adopted heir must also be at least a day 
younger than the adoptive parent. Adoptees’ average age at adoption is over twenty, and the vast 
majority of adoptions registered in Japan each year are between consenting adults (Bryant 1990, p. 
300). Elsewhere, adult adoption is vanishingly rare (Kitsuse 1964).10 O'Halloran (2009) notes that 
Japan’s “… continuing tradition of providing for the adoption of adults, is without any comparable 
precedent among developed nations.”  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
  Table 1 summarizes these patterns in adoptions through the postwar period. More recent 
statistics show rising predominance of adult adoption than earlier in the postwar period, averaging 
97 to 98% since 1990. Thus, of the 83,505 adoptions registered by Koseki offices in 2004, only 
1,330  (1.6%)  were  of  children.11 The  higher  rates  of  child  adoption  in  the  years  immediately 
following the war are perhaps due to war orphans.  
  Ordinary adoption sanctifies the voluntary severing of most, but not all, ties to one’s birth 
parents and their replacement with fealty to new parents. The adoptee may remain in contact with 
his birth parents, and may even inherit from them. If the adoptive relationship is disrupted, the 
adopted child may return to his biological parents.  
Calling ordinary adoption a transaction is appropriate, for Hayes and Habu (2006, pp. 2-3) 
                                                 
8   This discussion follows Hayes and Habu (2006, ch. 1).  
9   Hayes and Habu (2006, Table 2, p 137).  
10   The Common Law, from which most English speaking countries derive their legal systems, initially did not 
sanction adoption. Although the practice occurred informally, adoptees could not inherit unless named as 
heirs in a legal will. The U.S legalized adoption in the mid-19th century, and the UK followed in 1926 (Bryant, 
1990, n. 6) Adult adoption, though legal in 47 U.S. states and the District of Columbia, remains rare and 
controversial for subverting gay marriage restrictions. Thus Wadlington (1966, p. 409) thunders that "our 
present system of adoption is designed to create through artificial means something resembling as closely as 
possible a normal parent-child relationship and not a freak or totally new form of relation."  
11   Koseki Offices, located in municipal offices, register all births, marriages, adoptions, address changes, and 
deaths.   7 
explain that “in Japanese society there continues to be a vein of unsentimental pragmatism towards 
adoption arrangements. There is a fairly widespread view that it is ethically acceptable for parents 
to become adopters for worldly objectives, even if they do not intend from the outset, to love the 
child as their own.” Lebra (1989, p. 203) clarifies that “nurturance and intimacy were secondary or 
irrelevant to the mandate of professional succession, and often were completely absent from the 
adoptive  relationship  –  even  where  the  adoptee  was  destined  to  become  the  new  head  of  the 
household.”12  
Most ordinary adoptees are adult sons (Paulson 1984, p. 165, 289) because the practice is 
designed to rescue biologically ill-fated families, not to provide for a needy child.13 Hayes and Habu 
(2006, p. 1) elaborate: “Adoptions can be used to reconstruct patriarchal families. Families with 
superfluous  sons  would  pair  them  off  in  a  combined  marriage  and  adoption  to  families  with 
daughters.” Since the incest law only proscribes sex between biological siblings, a daughter and 
adopted son may marry. That a term, muko yôshi, exists to describe a husband-who-is-also-an-
adopted-brother indicates this to be an accepted and relatively commonplace form of adoption; and 
Paulson (1984) reports 55% of adoptions in 1981 to be of sons-in-law. Of course, if a desirable 
potential  son  is  already  married,  an  adult  married  couple  can  also  be  adopted  in  a  single 
transaction. 
Parents who adopt adult sons either lack biological sons or desire better quality sons than 
nature provided. Nakane (1967) argues that families seldom disinherit a biological son in favor of 
an adopted son, but ethnographic work convincingly refutes this. Beardsley et al. (1959) report at 
least one instance of adopted sons superseding biological sons in the histories of 25% to 33% of 
rural families; Pelzel (1970) estimates its frequency at 25%, and Bachnik (1983) puts its incidence 
at 34%. Pre-modern records indicate even higher frequencies (Bachnik 1983, p. 163).  
The patriarch of a family business can thus adopt a new son, say a star employee, should his 
biological sons prove uninterested or incapable of honoring the family name. This occurs with some 
regularity  (Paulson  1984,  165-75;  Kurosu  1998;  Hayes  and  Habu  2006,  p.  2).  In  this  context, 
translating yôshi as adoption might be confusing. Terms like protégé or successor might seem at 
least as appropriate as adopted son. Similar relationships, but between family business patriarchs 
and  favored  junior  associates  who  become  “like  sons”,  may  well  occur  less  visibly  in  other 
countries. However, the Japanese adult adoptee does take his new family’s name and ancestors, and 
enjoys inheritance status equal to that of biological offspring,14 so the common translation of yôshi 
as adoption seems the most defensible.  
This echoes a linguistic ambiguity as to what constitutes a family versus a firm. A Japanese 
family business is referred to as a house (ie or 家), as in the House of Mitsui; but ie also means family 
or household.15 This conflation also occurs in West, as with the House of Windsor and J.P. Morgan’s 
19th century bank, the House of Morgan . Repackaging a business as a family is readily dismissible as 
“an ideological obfuscation created by those at the top of the economic hierarchy” (Hayes and Habu 
2006, p. 12). But something more is clearly going on where an adopted top manager subsequently 
becomes the head of both the adopting family and its business. Inheritance tax law pertaining to 
succession in ie may have also played a role in fostering the adoption tradition in Japan. Edo period 
law (pre-war) mandated that only the master of the ie could inherit the ie, who in turn must be a 
                                                 
12   Quoted in Hayes and Habu (2006, p. 11).  
13   The remainder include minors as well as adults of both genders, but the vast majority are presumably 
males. A stigma attaches to adopting females because of past abuses.  
14   See Rohl (2005) for a description of the development of civil law in Japan from 1868 to post-war.  
15   The ie lost its legal status after World War II (Oppler, 1976, pp. 116-120); but Bachnik (1983) outlines its 
continued informal usage and the difficulties this causes translators.    8 
male with the same family name (see, among others, Rohl, 2005). Consequently, if the head of the 
household passed away, the family had to find a new male head, lest the ie slip into the hands of the 
state or next of kin. Adult adoptions provided a solution to this crisis.  
It is tempting to see adoption as a liberal adaptation allowing “competent individuals to 
surmount rigid social barriers” in Japan’s hierarchical society (Burke 1962, pp. 108-9). Haynes and 
Habu (2006, p. 12) more warily suggest that “the overlap between family and business concerns, 
potentially at least, forms an integrated social ethos in which the aspirations of a powerless child 
can find a place.” Although, they caution against pressing this too far, noting that many ordinary 
adoptions are within extended families, Macfarlane (2002) notes that “those who were adopted 
were not necessarily or even primarily blood relatives” and cites several studies that support the 
view that “adoption became a mechanism for social mobility” in pre-modern Japan. In our sample, 
adopted  successors  at  Kajima  Construction,  Suzuki  Motors,  Taisho  Pharmaceutical,  and  were 
entirely  biologically  unrelated  to  the  controlling  family.  Our  data  thus  appear  consistent  with 
Macfarlane’s assertion; however, a complete  investigation of remote biological ties is too time-
consuming to be practicable, and thus lies beyond the scope of this study.  
The Japanese government restricts adult adoption for fiscal reasons. The 1988 revision to 
the tax law prevents testators from evading inheritance taxes via multiple adoptions. Thenceforth, 
an adopter with one or more biological children may bequeath to one adoptee only, and an adopter 
lacking any biological children may bequeath to two adoptees (Nakagawa 1991, 89). A parent might 
still adopt many sons in order to have a broader choice of successors, but since only one may 
inherit, the supply of eager second, third, and fourth adoptees may be meager.  
Foreigners  periodically  sought  to  change  Japanese  adoption  practices,  which  seemed 
immoral to Chinese and Western sensibilities alike. Chinese legal imports, beginning with the Taiho 
Code of 702 A.D., sought to impose Confucian morals restricting adoptions to blood relatives (Mass 
1989, 9-11, 25, 72). In seeming deference to European sensibilities, Japan’s imported Civil Code 
(§792-3)  mandates  that  the  adopted child  be  at  least  a  day  younger  than  the  adopting  parent 
(Takenoshita 1997, p. 9).16 Both imports sought to fit Japanese pegs into foreign holes. The Taiho 
Code was soon “improved”, and modern registries sometimes let a younger parent adopt an older 
child “by mistake” (Nishioka 1991, pp. 232-4).  
  Foreign criticisms of Japanese adult adoption practices are not entirely groundless. Before 
the Great War, families adopted children as de facto slaves, sold by their biological parents; and 
brothel owners adopted their prostitutes.17 Draft dodgers became “only sons” of childless families, 
to escape conscription (Paulson 1984, 278-9). Adult adoptions are also used to hide affairs or to 
circumvent money lending laws (Bryant 1990).  
But  Japan’s  adult  adoptions  perhaps  evoke  condemnation  because  they  challenge  the 
conventions of other cultures. Elsewhere in East Asia, adoptions are a duty of blood relatives. In 
contrast,  “the  more  rigid  forms  of  Confucianism  have  not  constrained  non-relative  adoption  in 
Japan to nearly the same degree as elsewhere” (Kaji 1999; see also Bryant 1990, n. 32).18 This 
shocked  and  appalled  Confucian  traditionalists,  like  Dazai  Shundai  (1680-1747),  who  deplores 
Japan's  “lawlessness”,  singling  out  its  “barbarous”  and  “promiscuous”  adoptions  as  “a  major 
example of chaos” (Lebra 1989, p. 185; quoting Kirby 1908). In the same vein, the 19th century 
                                                 
16  Japan’s adopted Civil Code is frequently described as imposing primogeniture and other Western 
inheritance concepts, and Western advisors at the time apparently genuinely believed this (see e.g. Morris, 
1894). However, Bachnik (1983, esp. pp. 168-9) explains at length how the Japanese wording of the Meiji Civil 
Code clearly permits the continuation of traditional adoption practices. See Wadlington (1966) on the 
importance of age differences in U.S. adoption law.  
17   Oppler (1976, 113 n 3; Paulson (1984, p. 271 & 275).  
18   Quoted in Hayes and Habu (2006, p. 11).    9 
historian Shigeno Aneki (1887) compares the “evils” of adoption to those of imperial abdication 
(Lebra 1989, p. 186).  
 
2.3  A Japanese Solution to the Pitfalls of Dynastic Governance 
The above is a vast oversimplification, but conveys the gist of adoption practices as they affect 
Japanese family businesses. We distill three potential economic implications:, which our empirical 
analysis subsequently explores.  
First, a business family, confronted with an heir who is incapable or ill-disposed to take 
over, can readily adopt a more able son. Adoption lets family firms expand their successor searches 
beyond biological sons, and even beyond blood kin and current in-laws, to include virtually the 
same applicant pool a widely held professionally managed firm might tap. This broader talent pool 
could let Japanese family firms boost their odds of succession to a highly talented heir.  
Second, professional managers working for a Japanese family firm are not automatically 
excluded from the top job of heir. Japanese family firms could thus, in theory at least, induce the 
tournament competition that professionally-run firms use to elicit effort from rising executives and 
put the most able manager in charge.  
Third, the threat of adoption could induce a greater work ethic in biological children, for 
“the eldest son too was sometimes forced out into the world, if a more competent younger or 
adopted son was appointed to succeed to the family property or rights” (Burke 1962, p. 109). Adult 
adoptions might thus counter the famous Carnegie Conjecture that inherited fortunes so deaden 
initiative and distort perspective as to virtually guarantee failure in running a great business.  
 
2.4  An Example of the Succession Process  
Suzuki Motor Corporation relies extensively on adoptees for the top job, which is currently held by 
Osamu Suzuki. Born Osamu Matsuda, he graduated from Chuo University in 1953, and worked at a 
bank until 1958 when, at age 28, he was adopted by the Suzuki patriarch, Shunzou Suzuki, married 
a Suzuki daughter (Shoko), and took the Suzuki family name – all simultaneously. Osamu joined 
Suzuki’s board in 1963, became President in 1978, and Chair in 2000. Figure 1 plots the career and 
family ties of Mr. Osamu Suzuki as a function of his age, and exemplifies the successions we study.  
  This succession continues a long Suzuki tradition of handing power down to adopted sons 
qua sons-in-law. Osamu Suzuki is the fourth in a succession of adopted heirs to serve as CEO of 
Suzuki Motors. Osamu, in turn, designated his son-in-law, Hirotaka Ono, as his heir, passing by his 
biological  son,  then  with  General  Motors  who  nonetheless  eventually  joined  Suzuki’s  board. 
Explaining his choice, the elder Osamu opined: “In terms of age and experience, Ono is more capable 
compared to (my) son.” In essence, skill and capability trumped blood ties for the top job. Mr. Ono’s 
unfortunate premature death forced Osamu to return as Chair and CEO in 2007, a post he has 
retained since.  
This case illustrates a typical Japanese family business adoptee. A university graduate in his 
mid-to-late twenties, the adoptee is very likely to marry a daughter of the current patriarch. He 
joins the family firm, and is promoted through the ranks and usually reaches the top job by age fifty. 
This long tenure in the family firm provides sufficient time for the ruling patriarch to observe, 
assess, and groom the adopted heir apparent.  
The sequence of events can vary somewhat. For example, the patriarch might choose a 
capable  current  employee  to  marry  his  daughter  first,  and  then  formally  adopt  him  later.  For 
example, Yasuda Zenjirō, patriarch of the prewar Yasuda financial group (zaibatsu) passed over his 
three  biological  sons  to  groom  his  son-in-law,  a  27-year-old  employee  and  Tokyo  University 
graduate, as his heir. The new son not only changed his family name from Iomi to Yasuda, but also 
changed his given name from Teichi to Zenjiro to affirm his status as heir apparent. The Yasuda 
were  not  unique;  recruiting  heirs  from  among  top  managers  was  not  unusual  among  pre-war   10 
zaibatsu business families (Kerbo and McKinstry, 1995). 
The adoptee can, like a biological son, be disinherited if he does not meet expectations, 
though this is extremely rare. The patriarch can designate a second adoptee his heir, or pass over 
his adoptee and designate a biological son. For example, in 1920, 13 years after the adoption, the 
Yasuda patriarch disinherited his adopted heir, who was then vice president. Legal dissolution of an 
adult adoption is possible if the adoptee disappears, deserts his new family, or returns to his old 
family. Dynastic families typically have a family council, at which the heads of different branches of 
the family resolve issues that arise between them; and in prewar times, family councils (rarely) 
successfully  dissolved  an  adoption  amid  an  unfolding  succession  (Rohl,  2005).  Our  postwar 
population contains no instances of such dissolutions.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
3.  Data Description 
We  begin  with  the  population  of  all  1,433  non-financial  firms  that  listed  in  all  Japanese  stock 
exchanges (the Tokyo, Nagoya, Fukuoka and Osaka stock exchanges) from 1949 (when markets 
reopened after the war to new listings, as well as previously listed prewar firms) through 1970. We 
follow  these  firms  from  1962,  when  standardized  financial  disclosure  begins,  until  2000  or  a 
delisting, whichever comes first.19 Our need for complete data on each firm’s ownership structure, 
board, and financial variables during that period cuts the sample to 1,367 firms. Our sample thus 
includes 95% of the population of listed firms during this window.  
 
3.1  Data sources 
Our ownership data are from the Development Bank of Japan database for 1981 through 2000, as 
are our accounting data from 1962 through 2000. The Toyo Keizai database provides information 
on stock prices and boards from 1989 through 2000. For prior years and years with missing data, 
we hand-collect ownership, board, and financial data from hardcopy annual reports available at the 
Institute of Innovation Research of Hitotsubashi University.  
Ownership data disclosed in annual reports include: (1) the stake of each of the top ten 
shareholders, (2) the combined stake of all banks and other financial sector firms, and (3) the 
combined  stake  of  all  other  firms.  Board  data  include  detailed  information  on  each  director’s 
education (alma mater, major, and graduation year), birth date, year initially hired, year appointed 
to the board, years made CEO (shacho) and Chairman (kaicho), and prior work experience.  
We identify each firm’s founder by consulting the following sources: (1) commemorative 
volumes  (shashi)  celebrating  firms’  anniversaries,  (2)  Toyokeizai  Shimposha  (1995),  (3)  Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun (2004), and (4) company websites. To identify relationships within the founding 
family, we use various Japanese language sources: (1) Tokiwa Shoin (1977) provides the family 
trees of 1002 business leaders, (2) a series of books published by Zaikai Kenkyusho (1979, 1981, 
1982, 1983, 1985) provides the names of family members of the boards of listed firms, and (3) a set 
of thirty-eight Nihon Keizai Shimbun (2004) volumes provides the biographies of 243 prominent 
postwar  business  leaders.  Additional  information  on  family  relationships  is  obtained  from  the 
following  sources:  Japanese  equivalents  of  Who’s  Who  published  by  Jinjikoshinjo,  the  Nikkei 
Telecom 21 database of corporate news items published from 1975 on in the Nikkei newspapers 
(Nihon Keizai Shimbun, the Nikkei Business Daily, the Nikkei Financial Daily and the Nikkei Marketing 
Journal), company archives, Koyano (2007), and website searches.  
Using all this information, we annotate family trees with the names and business roles of 
                                                 
19   From 1970 to 1990, only 31 firms in our sample delist. A further 95 delist from 1991 through 2000. The 
remarkable longevity of Japanese firms prior to the 1990s corroborates Fogel et al. (2008) on this point.    11 
all biological and adopted members of each firm’s founding family. This information lets us identify 
each firm’s founder(s) and ultimate owners, and ascertain each CEO/Chairman’s relationship, if any, 
to the founding family by blood, marriage, or adoption.  
 
3.2  Defining and classifying family firms 
Previous  family  firm  studies  have  been  criticized  for  overly  broad  definitions  of  family  firms 
(Bertrand and Schoar 2006) that also include firms run by their founders. We therefore use an 
alternative term, the Japanese word don (ドン, lit. boss), and designate firms run by their founder or 
their founders’ heirs, biological or adopted, as don firms.20  
  We  consider  the  individual  who  establishes  a  business  as  its  founder.  For  example,  a 
business established in the Edo period, restructured into a partnership during the early Meiji era, 
incorporated in the early 20th century, taken public in the 1920s, and relisted in 1949, is founded by 
the person who first established it in the Edo period.  
  By “run” we mean that the founder or founding family retains either a substantial equity 
stake or a substantial role in management. We thus define a don firm as one with a member of its 
founding  family  (or  family’s  foundation)  listed  among  its  top  ten  shareholders  or  serving  in  a 
leadership position: either as CEO (shacho) or chairman (daihyo torishimariyaku kaicho). If only one 
founding family member fulfills these requirements, we call that person the firm’s don. If more than 
one founding family member appears in these roles, we define don as the one serving as CEO or 
chairman. If both positions are occupied by members of the founding family, we take the don as the 
older. Thus, if a founder is a top ten shareholder, but does not serve as CEO or chairman, and an heir 
serves in a leadership position, the heir is classified as don. This is clearly a judgment call, but we 
presume that, in these firms, the heir is the actual decision-maker.  
  We designate firms lacking dons as non-don firms. We thus employ the following indicator 
functions δj,t(k) in our analyses:  
 
[1]        don     1 if  irm j has a don in year t
 0 otherwise 
  
 
[2]         n-don     0 if  irm j has a don in year t
 1 otherwise 
  
 
We also partition non-don firms into those that had a don at one time during our sample period, 
denoted former-don firms; and firms that had a don at no time during our sample period, denoted 
never-don firms.  
Villalonga and Amit (2006) argue that earlier U.S. family business studies misclassify firms 
like Microsoft and Berkshire Hathaway, whose founders (Bill Gates and Warren Buffett) explicitly 
bequeath  their  fortunes  to  charities,  not  their  children.  They  therefore  recommend  a  tighter 
definition of family firms as those in which control has actually passed to the founder’s heirs. Our 
don firms roughly correspond to the broader category they criticize, and likely also includes many 
businesses that ought not to be considered family firms.  
We therefore denote true family firms as those whose current don is the previous don’s 
heir. This narrower definition understates the incidence of family firms, for it excludes firms run by 
founders who plan to pass control to their heirs. However, it has the virtue of including only firms 
unambiguously identifiable as family firms. Other don firms – those still run by their founders – we 
call founder-run firms. We formalize this with the indicator variables  
                                                 
20   For lack of a better term, we use this archaic title for a high-status male, now seldom found except in 
formal business letters. The title derives from the Latin dominus, meaning lord, via the Portuguese dom.    12 
 
[3]       founder     1 if  irm j 's don in year t is its founder 
 0 otherwise 
  
 
[4]       family     1 if  irm j 's don in year t is an heir 
 0 otherwise 
  
 
Finally, we partition true family firms into subcategories according to the position of the 
current don and his relationship to the previous one. A firm whose current don serves as CEO or 
chairman and is the previous don’s biological son we call a blood heir firm. A firm whose current don 
serves as CEO or chairman and is the previous don’s adopted son, adopted son-in-law, or son-in-law 
we  call  a  non-blood heir firm. Our  data  include  no  instances  of  daughters  taking  over.  A  third 
category of true family firm arises where a biological heir ranks among the top ten shareholders, but 
delegates  both  the  CEO  and  Chairman  positions  to  professional  managers.  These  we  denote 
sarariman firms.21  
Our data contain no non-blood heirs adopted as children, consistent with the rarity of this 
practice.  All  but  two  of  the  legally  adopted  heirs  in  our  sample  also  marry  a  daughter  of  the 
founding family.  
  We designate all firms whose current dons are their previous dons’ adopted sons or sons-in-
law  as  a  second  category:  non-blood heir firms.  This  is  justifiable  if  the  dons  impose  arranged 
marriages on their daughters, but may be problematic if daughters chose their own mates. The 
former  assumption  is  reasonable  because  arranged  marriages  (omiai),  in  which  dons  select 
husbands  for  their  daughters  on  the  basis  of  business  advantage,  persist  in  Japanese  business 
families (Hamabata, 1991; Kerbo and McKinstry, 1995). Nevertheless, we recognize that adopted 
and un-adopted sons-in-law may be either selected differently by the founder, or may be subject to 
different incentives since it is only the former who enjoy full inheritance rights under the post-war 
legal  code  in  Japan.  We  return  to  this  issue  in  the  robustness  section,  where  we  compare 
performance under adopted and un-adopted sons-in-law and find no material difference between 
the two, buttressing our contention that both sets of sons-in-law can be treated as one category.  
 
[5]                      1 if  irm j 's don in year t is a blood heir 
 0 otherwise 
  
 
[6]       non-blood heir     1 if  irm j 's don in year t is a adopted son or son-in-law 
 0 otherwise 
  
 




  We have 62 cases of families succeeded by sarariman CEOs (founder to sarariman: 24 cases, 
family to sarariman: 38 cases), who soon thereafter step aside for a family heir. News reports 
clarify the temporary status of these interim CEOs: they are minding the firm while the designated 
heir prepares to take charge. Thus Canon made Ryuzaburo Kaku, a professional manager, its CEO in 
1977 amid declarations that the controlling family’s , fuzio Mitarai, aged 42, would soon take charge. 
Takeda Pharmaceutical likewise appointed company manager Yoshimasa Umemoto (unrelated to 
the family) CEO while the family’s designated heir, Kunio Takeda, aged 46, readied himself. Both 
heirs ascended to their CEO job shortly after turning 50. Similarly brief interludes of professional 
                                                 
21   The Japanese term for a professional manager is sarariman, from the English “salary man”. The term 
connotes an executive who works long hours, but does not control his destiny.    13 
management also occurred at Pioneer, Toyota, and other family firms.22 
  These are all clearly family firms, where interim CEOs serve as temporary place-holders, not 
as  masters.  Their  controlling  families  are  clearly  not  permanently  handing  over  power  to 
professionals. We therefore define sarariman firms as those whose controlling families delegate 
management to a chain of sarariman CEOs. We exclude successions to sarariman who are, in turn, 
replaced  by  family,  blood  or  non-blood heirs. This  is  because  our sample  contains  successions 
where the old patriarch steps aside before the heir apparent is ready to take charge. In such cases, a 
sarariman takes over as interim CEO amid a general understanding that the heir will soon take 
charge.  We revisit  this issue  in  the  robustness  check section  below  to  check  if  our  results  are 
different when we include some or all such place-holders in the sarariman category. 
  The partitioning of family firms in [5], [6], and [7] raises the issue of whether non-blood 
heirs – adopted sons or sons-in-law – should be identified as an alternative to heirs or to sarariman 
CEOs. In particular, the sarariman tradition is widely accepted in Western industrial democracies, 
particularly  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K.  where  CEOs  as  a  rule  tend  to  be  unrelated  to  dominant 
shareholders, and it is natural to ask the question whether sufficiently high powered compensation 
packages may render a sarariman materially identical to an adopted son CEO. At issue is whether 
sarariman and adopted sons are treated the same, or whether adopted sons are treated more like 
blood sons, and sarariman more like the hired agents that they are.  
  We explore this by comparing the tenures of the three categories of successor. Founders 
unsurprisingly remain at the helm longest: serving for a mean of 30.23 years and a median of 30 
years. Sarariman CEOs in family firms have the shortest tenures: averaging only 6.31 years with 
half gone after 5 years. However, blood and non-blood heirs’ tenures are essentially identical: blood 
heirs average 18.74 years and non-blood heirs average 18.4 years; half of blood heirs are gone after 
16 years and half of non-blood heirs are gone after 17 years. We conclude that non-blood heirs’ 
control positions are as secure as those of blood heirs, and that both are far more secure than the 
positions of sarariman CEOs.23  
Figure 2 shows the number of don firms by year. The initial 1962 cross-section of our panel 
contains a total of 1,060 firms; and of these, 37% are don firms versus 63% non-don firms. Of the 
don firms, 17% are founder-run and the remaining 20% are true family firms. Of the true family 
firms, 41 are run by non-blood heirs – comprising almost a fifth of family firms and 4% of the full 
sample.  
By the end of our analysis period, in 2000, don firms are 31% of the total, down 6% from 
1962. Founder-run firms decline to less than 1% of the 2000 sample (as founders retire or pass 
away). True family firms represent about 30% of our sample in 2000, having held roughly steady at 
this fraction from 1980 onwards. Non-don firms represent almost 69% of all firms in 2000.  
The total fraction of don firms in Japan resembles that of family firms in U.S. Fortune 500 
reported by Anderson and Reeb (2003), whose definition of family firm resembles ours for don 
firms. Thus, while neither America nor Japan is an economy of family firms, founders and heirs 
collectively appear more important than generally accredited in both countries.  
If family firms are defined as those controlled by second or later generation heirs, only 7% 
of the Fortune 500 firms qualify (Villalonga and Amit 2006). This is substantially less than the 30% 
of our sample characterized by inherited family control. While the two samples are not directly 
                                                 
22   The mean age of the ultimate biological heir is 40 in these cases, consistent with sarariman CEOs serving 
as placeholders until the heir matures.  
23  Studying S&P 500 firms from 1992 through 2004, Coates and Kraakman (2007) report the mean tenure of 
hired CEOs to be 5.5 years and that of equity control blockholder CEOs to be 13.4 years.    14 
comparable,24 our  data  reveal  family  control  in  postwar  Japan  to  be  undeniably  economically 
significant – a fact generally not acknowledged in discussions of Japanese corporate governance.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
3.3  Variables 
A multidimensional approach to measuring firm performance is needed because Japanese law does 
not mandate that firms be run to maximize shareholder value, and because banks and employees 
interests are often posited to trump those of shareholders (Porter et al. 2000). We describe each 
performance  measure  in  turn.  Summary  statistics  are  in  Table  2.  Robustness  checks  using 
alternative definitions of the variable are deferred to section 4.4.   
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Shareholder valuation 
We gauge shareholder valuation by a firm’s Tobin’s average Q ratio (Q) - its market value divided by 
its replacement cost: that is, its value to all its investors divided by the cost of replacing all of its 
measurable assets. A higher Q means the firm’s value is augmented by greater net intangible assets 
– presumed, partly at least, to reflect superior past and/or expected future management. Average Q 
ratios, measured relative to industry benchmarks to exclude factors beyond managers’ control, are 
therefore sensible measures of the quality of corporate governance (Morck et al. 1988; Gompers et 
al. 2003; Bebchuk and Cohen 2005) when stock markets are passably efficient, and perhaps even 
amid common bubbles (Samuelson 1998; Jung and Shiller 2005).  
  We  define  market  value  as  the  price  of  the  firm’s  stock  times  the  number  of  shares 
outstanding plus the book value of its total liabilities. This values control blocks at public share 
prices,  consistent  with  the  near-zero  private  benefits  of  control  Dyck  and  Zingales  (2004)  and 
Nenova (2003) report for Japan.  
  We estimate replacement cost as the book value of total assets plus adjustments for equity 
holdings and real estate. Almost ten percent of the assets of the typical firm in our sample are 
shares in other firms, and this fraction is much higher in many firms. These shares are carried at 
historical cost. We therefore multiply the book value of a firm’s equity holdings in a given year by 
the cumulative return of the Nikkei Index from when the equity was acquired to the present. To 
estimate the age of equity holdings, we look at all past acquisitions and disposals of equity, and 
assume that the most recently acquired shares are the first to be disposed of. Real estate holdings, 
also carried at book, are adjusted analogously using the Japanese Real Estate Index.  
 
Current profitability  
Our second performance measure is each firm’s return on assets (ROA), defined as operating income 
divided by replacement cost, as estimated above. Operating income is earnings before interest costs, 
tax, and depreciation and amortization. This figure captures a firm’s current profitability, a measure 
of short-term financial performance.  
 
Sales and employment growth 
Japanese firms, at least for a large part of the postwar period, arguably sought non-financial goals, 
                                                 
24   Our sample includes almost all Japanese firms that listed up to 1970, but no newer listings. Villalonga and 
Amit’s sample of Fortune 500 contains only very large firms, whose control blocks are likely correspondingly 
smaller, and includes newer firms, whose founders are more likely to survive.    15 
such  as  market  share  or  employment,  rather  than  financial  objectives,  such  as  profits  or 
shareholder value (Aoki 1990; Porter 1990; Abegglen & Stalk 1985; Tsuru 1996; Geringer et al. 
1999; Ahmadjian & Robbins 2005; Kubo 2005; and others); though others dissent (e.g. Kang and 
Shivdasani 1995, 1997). Regardless of the social welfare implications of such alternative objective 
functions, the degree to which different categories of our firms deviate from value maximization is 
of interest.  
  We therefore examine sales growth rates as one such non-financial performance measure. 
We define sales growth as the logarithm of the firm’s current year sales less the logarithm of its 
sales  one  year  earlier.  Nominal  sales  are  used  because  inflation  remained  low  throughout  the 
sample window. Our second non-financial performance measure is employment growth, defined as 
the logarithm of the firm’s current year number of employees less the logarithm of the number of 
its employees one years prior.  
 
Control variables 
The statistical tests in the next section require various controls. Industry fixed effects are defined 
using the two-digit Development Bank of Japan industry codes. Leverage is long-term debt scaled by 
estimated replacement cost. Capital expenditure for year t is the change in fixed assets from year t-1 
to year t, plus depreciation in year t. It is scaled by total sales in year t. Firm age is measured from 
the year of incorporation of the firm. Firm size is the logarithm of replacement cost.  
 
4.  Findings 
4.1  Subsample comparisons 
Our first sets of statistical tests, shown in Table 3, contrast dimensions of firm performance across 
differently controlled firms.25 Across the board, founder-run firms are the best performers, followed 
by non-blood heir-run firms. Though non-don firms are the largest of all, non-blood heir-run firms 
are substantially larger than all other don firms. However, they are not greatly different in terms of 
leverage. Unsurprisingly founder-run firms are younger than all other categories, and also more 
narrowly held, though non-blood heir-run firms are the second most narrowly held category.  
   
[Table 3 about here] 
 
  Our  sample  is  very  nearly  equal  to  the  full  population  of  listed  Japanese  firms,  so  the 
numbers in Table 3 are essentially population means, and are thus economically meaningful even 
without  formal  statistical  tests.  To  compare  performance  across  these  categories  formally,  we 
nonetheless  perform  t-tests  across  categories,  controlling  for  year  and  industry  fixed  effects, 
clustering  residuals  by  firm  to  compensate  for  longitudinal  persistence.  To  do  this  we  run 
regressions of the form  
 






t j k t j e d c k b , , , ) (                
 
where 
t j,   is firm j’s performance in year t (in terms of one of ROA, Q, sales growth or labor force 
growth); the δj,t(k) are a proper subset of indicator variables [1] through [7], with k one of founder, 
blood heir, non-blood heir, sarariman, or non-don. The δt are year fixed effects; the δi are industry 
                                                 
25  We winsorize the data at 1% to attenuate the effect of extreme observations.  Later in the  robustness 
tests section, we repeat our main tests using un-winsorized data.     16 
fixed effects; and the ej,t are residuals, clustered by firm. The t-tests are to reject the null hypothesis 
that a coefficient bk is zero, and are displayed in Table 4.  
  In terms of profitability and shareholder valuation, founder firms statistically significantly 
outperform every other category of firm except non-blood heirs, whose firms perform statistically 
indistinguishably from founder firms. Founder firms significantly outperform non-blood heir firms 
only in sales and labor force growth rates. This is unsurprising, since Table 3 shows non-blood heir 
firms  to  be  substantially  larger  (¥164B  versus  ¥58.2B)  and  older  (43  versus  29  years  since 
founded), and are thus plausibly less prone to very rapid growth.  
  The panel using non-don firms as the benchmark shows family firms (don firms excluding 
founder firm) outperforming non-don firms across the board. Notably, this performance premium 
rests primarily upon blood heir-run firms and non-blood heir run firms, not on family firms run by 
professional  sarariman  CEOs.  The  second  panel,  using  firms  run  by  their  founders’  blood 
descendents as the benchmark, confirms that founders outperform founders’ progeny across the 
board;  but  that  blood  heirs  outperform  non-don  firms.  Non-blood  heirs  outperform  or  tie  all 
categories save founders; in particular, non-blood heirs outpace blood heirs, sarariman, and non-
don managers in profitability, and outpace sarariman and non-don managers in valuation. Finally, 
sarariman  firms  outperform  no  other  category  at  all,  and  lag  all  other  classes  of  don  firms. 
Sarariman-run  family  firms’  performance  is  statistically  indistinguishable  from  that  of  non-don 
firms.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
4.2  Regressions controlling for firm characteristics 
Table 5 expands upon the results in Table 4 by controlling for firm characteristics: size, leverage, 
capital spending and age, in regressions of the form  
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where πj,t is one of our firm performance measures, the δj,t(k) are some proper subset of the firm-
control indicator variables [1] through [7], the xj,t are control variable, the δt are year fixed effects, 
the δi are industry fixed effects, and the ej,t are residuals, again clustered by firm.  
As in Tables 3 and 4, founder-run firms and family firms both significantly outperform non-
don  firms  in  all  dimensions.  Larger  firms  and  firms  with  more  aggressive  capital  budgeting 
generally outperform, while more leveraged firms and older firms generally underperform.  
 
[Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
 
After controlling for these firm-level characteristics, in addition to industry and year fixed 
effects, and again clustering  residuals by firm, Table 5 reconfirms the superior performance of 
founder and family firms across all dimensions of firm performance.  
  Table 6 replicates the regressions in Table 5, but using different firm categories as the 
benchmark  for  statistical  comparison.  Only  the  coefficients  for  the  control  groups  (δj,t(k))  are 
presented to facilitate inter-group comparison. The pattern of signs and significance levels in Table 
6 is little different from that in Table 4.  
  In terms of profitability and shareholder valuation, founder firms statistically significantly 
outperform every other category of firm except non-blood heirs, whose firms perform statistically 
indistinguishably from founder firms in terms of accounting profits and shareholder valuations. As   17 
in Table 4, founder firms significantly outperform non-blood heir firms in sales and labor force 
growth rates. Since firm size and age are among the control variables in Tables 5 and 6, neither of 
these factors can explain the high growth rates of founder firms. This suggests that the founders of 
firms that list during their founders lifetimes are an unusual class of people, perhaps possessing a 
scarce  entrepreneurial  talent  (Knight  1921;  Hayek  1945;  Schumpeter  1950).  Since  we  do  not 
observe founder-run firms that grow insufficiently to list within their founders’ lifetimes, a self-
selection problem may be present – we only observe the best founder-run firms. Comparing the 
other categories to founder-run firms thus tests them against a perhaps overly high hurdle.  
  The panel using non-don firms as the benchmark again shows non-founder family firms 
outperform non-don firms across the board, save that non-blood heir firms no longer outgrow non-
don  firms.  The  margin  by  which  non-blood  heir  firms  outperform  non-don  firms  in  terms  of 
accounting  profits  and  shareholder  valuations  now  exceeds  that  for  blood  heir  firms;  and  this 
difference is highly significant for accounting profits – though not for valuations. After controlling 
for  size,  age,  leverage,  and  capital  spending,  non-blood  heirs  match  or  surpass  blood  heirs. 
Sarariman-run family firms’ performance again lags that of the other two types of family firm, with 
performance statistically indistinguishable from that of non-don firms.  
  The tables also tentatively suggest that blood heir firms might attend more to the arguably 
uniquely important Japanese corporate goals of employment and sales growth, though. Non-don 
firms and sarariman firms, the categories for which financial performance might arguably be the 
least important, show no evidence of exceptional employment or sales growth performance.  
 
4.3  Causality 
The  results  above  demonstrate  a  set  of  correlations  between  firm  performance  and  control. 
However, causation is unresolved. Non-blood heirs might replace biological sons in the negative tail 
of  the  talent  bell  curve;  and  the  threat  of  being  replaced  by  a  non-blood  son  might  blunt  the 
deadening of talent Carnegie (1899) postulates afflicting heirs to great fortunes.  
  But the converse is also possible. A current don might be more prone to pass control to a 
beloved son if the firm is running more smoothly; and the son might covet control of a better 
performing family firm more earnestly (Bennedsen et al. 2007). Smith and Amoako-Adu (2005) and 
Perez-Gonzalez (2006) overcome this endogeneity problem with event studies that show stock 
price declines upon the announcement that control is to pass to a son, rather than a professional 
manager, in Canadian and US family firms, respectively. Bennedsen et al. (2007) overcome the 
problem by noting that family succession is more likely, independently of firm performance, if the 
old don’s firstborn child is male. This lets them identify inherited corporate control as causing poor 
performance in Danish family firms.  
  The  grooming  of  a  successor  likely  begins  years  before  the  actual  succession  event, 
presumably  at  adoption  where  there  is  a  formal  adoption,  and  the  succession  probabilities 
presumably  resolve  over  time.  This  precludes  precisely  defined  abnormal  stock  return  event 
studies of successions. We therefore develop a set of endogeneity tests similar in spirit to those of 
Bennedsen et al. (2007), utilizing information we possess about controlling families, and employ a 
less  precise  event  study  methodology  than  that  of  Smith  and  Amoako-Adu  (2005)  and  Perez-
Gonzalez (2006), which works against finding significant effects. Since information about business 
families’  succession  plans  may  enter  the  public  domain  slowly,  and  well  in  advance  of  actual 
successions, equity value changes upon successions are especially likely to be biased towards zero.  
  We define a succession event as the transfer of control from a don to a successor, who may 
be either part of the family (via blood or adoption), a sarariman amenable to the blockholder family, 
or an outsider where the founder or his heirs sell out. We identify 915 such events; but drop 18 
where control shifts from a founder to a co-founder, 124 that involve either an incoming or an 
outgoing temporary sarariman, 117 where the succession event was within 7 years of a previous   18 
succession event, and 231 for lack of complete family tree data. This leaves 425 econometrically 
viable succession events, listed in the first two columns of Table 7. 
  The most common succession event – 57% of the total – is to blood heirs, reinforcing the 
importance of traditional family firms in Japan. However, almost one in ten family firms opts for 
non-blood heirs; and almost one in five turns management over to a sarariman and becomes a 
seemingly passive blockholder. In over 85% of successions, the family thus stays on – either in 
direct charge or as a blockholder. The family cashes out in less than 15% of successions.  
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
  Inspection of the succession events reveals a few regularities. First, non-blood successions 
occur where the controlling family’s stake is larger. The mean family control block is 13.4% in 
successions to blood heirs, but 18.6% in successions to non-blood heirs. The difference in medians 
is  even  starker:  8.7%  for  blood  versus  18.4%  for  non-blood  heirs.  Both  differences  are  highly 
significant (p = 0.02 and 0.01 for mean and median differences, respectively). Conceivably, families 
more closely tied to their firms dare not risk an iffy blood heir. Alternatively, families’ larger blocks 
might anticipate superior performance under non-blood heirs.  
Second, non-blood heirs’ personal equity blocks average 3.6% of their firms’ equity in the 
three years after the succession (up from 3.4% the in three years prior).26 Since the heir becomes 
head of the family, it may be more appropriate to consider the whole of the family’s stake as in his 
charge –averaging roughly ¥8.74 billion in 2000 constant yen (approximately US$87 million). 27 
That is, a star manager who becomes an adopted son and/or son-in-law wins stewardship of a 
fortune averaging about $87 million, along with all the attendant power, influence, and status.28 The 
typical  Japanese  CEO’s  compensation  –  measured  as  salary  plus  bonus  plus  stock  options  -  is 
modest compared to a similarly situated US C.E.O. (Kato and Kubo 2006). However, if we include 
the inheritance of a family fortune as compensation, the lifetime income of Japanese CEOs becomes 
highly skewed. Conceivably, the chance of becoming heir to a family business might attract talent 
and inspire effort in Japanese family firms, effects associated with tournament competition for high 
paying CEO jobs in professionally managed U.S. firms (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Demsetz 1996; 
Frank and Cook 1996).  
Our strategy is to look at performance changes around succession events, and regress 
these cross-sectionally on indicator variables for the different types of succession shown in Table 7. 
That is, we run regressions of the form  
 
[10]   
 
where the xj are control variable, the δt are succession year fixed effects, set to one if succession j 
occurs in year t and to zero otherwise; the δi are industry fixed effects; and the ej are residuals. We 
now use j to index successions, rather than firms; and the δj(k) are now defined in [11] through [14] 
below. Some firms have more than one succession event, so all standard errors are computed by 
clustering at the firm level.  
                                                 
26   In contrast, blood heirs stakes average 2.7% in the three years after succession, up from 2.6% in the three 
years before. Both are significantly below the corresponding non-blood heir means.  
27   All inheritance figures are converted to 2000 constant yen at the CPI.    
28   Mean (median) family stakes in the panel are worth approximately ¥16.3 (¥0.69) billion under non-blood 









j n n j e d c k b x a               ) ( ) ( , ) (      19 
  The dependent variable, πj, is the change in one of firm j’s performance measures: ROA, Q, 
sales growth, or labor growth. Differences are two-years following the event year minus two-year 
means prior to the event year. The event year is excluded because we cannot date the succession 
events precisely. We use two-year performance windows because Japanese boards typically vote on 
renewing CEO s’ contracts biannually.  
  The control variables, xj, include firm size, firm age, leverage, and capital expenditure. We 
employ these because larger, older, less leveraged firms plausibly have more stable performance 
over time, and because firms with larger capital budgets allow greater scope for unqualified CEOs to 
cause damage.29 Succession year fixed effects should remove macroeconomic factors, and industry 
fixed effects should remove industry related performance trends, also plausibly unrelated to the 
effects of succession.  
  We now use k to index the type of successor who replaces the departing don, encoded as 
follows:  
 
[11]                    1 if  irm j 's new don is a blood heir of the old don 
 0 otherwise 
  
 
[12]     non-blood heir     1 if  irm j 's new don is the old don's adopted son or son-in-law 
 0 otherwise 
  
 
[13]     sarariman     1 if  irm j 's controlling family hires a professional CEO 
 0 otherwise 
  
 
 [14]      ash out     1 if  irm j 's controlling family liquidates its control block 
 0 otherwise 
  
 
  Our regressions [10] are run on a sample of 425 successions, of which 242 are to blood heirs, 
42 are to non-blood heirs, 81 leave sarariman CEOs running firms with family blockholders, and 60 
see  the  family  cashing  out  and  departing  completely  from  the  scene.  Table  8  summarizes  the 
coefficients of the succession type indicator variables; those of the controls and fixed effects are 
suppressed for brevity. The table shows the largest relative performance increases when non-blood 
heirs take over, and the largest relative performance declines when the family turns the firm over to 
a sarariman, but remains a blockholder. Successions to blood heirs and cashing out are in between, 
and statistically indistinguishable.  
  As noted above, inferences from Table 8 are complicated by possible selection bias: perhaps 
non-blood heirs are chosen more often by firms anticipating good times; perhaps family firms hire 
sarariman CEOs when bad times lie ahead and family members dare not step in.  
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
  To  explore  these  issues,  we  estimate  two-stage  least  squares  (2SLS)  analogs  to  the 
regressions in Table 8. Our first stage uses multinomial logit to estimate probabilities for different 
types of succession event,30  
                                                 
29   With a mean age of 52, incoming family CEOs are younger than their non-family counterparts (mean age 
61). The typical family firm is also younger: 46 years old at the succession vs. 50 for non-family firms. Blood 
and non-blood heirs have statistically indistinguishable mean ages at their successions; as do their firms.  
30   Sequential logit comparing two succession choices at a time are ill-suited for the first stage since we have 
no strong priors regarding which two succession types ought to be considered first. By contrast, the 
multinomial logit allows us to be more agnostic regarding the priority of succession types, giving the outgoing   20 
[15]   
 
and the second stage uses cross sectional OLS to estimate the exogenous effects of these succession 
events on firm performance, viz.  
 
[16]   
 
  To operationalize the strategy in [15] and [16], we require variables, denoted {zm,j} in [15] 
that are plausibly exogenous for economic reasons, correlated strongly with the actual succession 
choices,  and  uncorrelated  with  the  true  residuals  in  [16].  Below  we  describe  the  set  of  three 
instruments  used  to  derive  predicted  successor  types  in  [15].  We  note  that  the  number  of 
instruments equals the number of successor choices in [16], making the model just identified.  
  Obviously, if the departing don lacks male issue, the firm is less likely to pass to a blood heir. 
Although  women  in  Japan  are  making  major  strides  towards  career  equality  in  other  spheres, 
female CEOs remain rare. Our first instrument is therefore an indicator variable set to one if we 
document the existence of a male blood heir to the current don, and to zero otherwise. We construct 
this variable by scanning through our family trees, constructed as described in section 3.1.  
Even if the current don has a biological son, the son may not be interested in the family 
business. Likewise, the current don may not wish to found a business dynasty, and may keep his 
relations  away  from  his  firm.  Our  second  instrument  therefore  measures  the  don’s  family’s 
involvement in his firm. We gauge this with an indicator variable set to one if the don has any blood 
relations (including siblings) on the board at the time of the firm’s IPO (sufficiently pre-dating the 
succession event), and zero otherwise.  
 Finally, a previous non-blood heir sets a family precedent, and may increase the odds of 
another. Our third instrumental variable is therefore a measure of the departing  don’s cultural 
amenability to adult adoption. This indicator variable is set to one if the controlling family adopted 
an adult son at any time in the past, including years prior to the IPO; and to zero otherwise.31  
Latent variables are always a concern in econometric frameworks of this sort, so we must 
include  appropriate  control  variables.  Obviously,  macroeconomic  effects  might  both  influence 
successions and firm performance. We therefore include succession year fixed effects in both stages. 
Many latent factors plausibly affect particular industries, so we include industry fixed effects in 
both stages. Older, highly leveraged, or larger firms may be qualitatively different from younger, 
less leveraged, or smaller ones, so we include logarithms of firm age and size, and book leverage, 
defined as in [10], in the second stage regression. We include capital expenditure to control for the 
effect of investment on performance changes.  
It is possible that a don is more likely to bequeath control to a blood heir who is more able 
and smart. That is, a more demonstrably able biological son is presumably a stronger succession 
                                                                                                                                                             
don a full menu of successor types to pick from. That is, he can decide to pass on the firm’s rein to a blood son, 
an adopted son, a sarariman, or to sell the firm to an outsider.  
31  We note that to be considered valid, the instrument must affect the second stage dependent variable only 
through the first stage choice. For example, it is possible that greater family involvement may directly affect 
performance. However, it is very unlikely that family involvement prior to succession affects the change in 
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candidate,  all  else  equal.  We  are  able  to  gauge  biological  sons’  general  intelligence  by  their 
university  degrees.  This  is  because  Japan  has  two  clearly  differentiated  types  of  universities: 
imperial  universities,  to  which  admission  depends  solely  on  entrance  examination  scores;  and 
other  universities,  to  which  admission  is  either  less selective  in  general or  possible  by  dint  of 
special quotas for graduates of expensive university-affiliated preparatory schools. The imperial 
universities –  Tokyo  University,  Kyoto  University,  Tohoku  University,  Osaka  University,  Kyushu 
University, Hokkaido University, and Nagoya University, along with Hitotsubashi University – each 
conduct their own rigorous entrance examinations, a process widely acknowledged to select solely 
on merit (Takeuchi 1997).32 Consequently, a degree from one of these reliably implies a high level 
of intelligence, and this presumably correlates with ability. Some other universities, notably elite 
private universities such as Keio and Waseda, also boast very highly qualified academic faculty. 
However, their alternate admissions paths – especially their university-run prep-school channels – 
make their degrees less reliable certifications than those of the imperial universities – especially for 
scions of wealthy families.33 Biological sons who attended imperial universities are thus almost 
surely quite intelligent; but those who attended other universities might or might not be.  
  Our control variable for blood heir ability is an indicator variable set to one if the biological 
son to the current don graduated from an imperial university, and to zero otherwise. We construct 
this variable by scanning through our director database for sons of dons, consulting firm and family 
histories, and checking the Japanese equivalent of Who’s Who and other data sources described in 
section 3.1 – these data precede the succession event. If the old don had more than one biological 
son, we set the dummy variable to one if any of his sons attended an imperial university.  
  The  distribution  of  imperial  university  graduates  across  blood  and  non-blood  heirs  is 
shown in the rightmost two columns of Table 7. Of the 242 biological sons who assume control of 
firms in our sample, only 51, or 21%, attended an imperial university; while 17, or 41% of the 42 
non-blood heirs did so. As a comparison, we note that non-blood heirs are almost twice as likely as 
blood heirs to be imperial university alumni (t-test p = 0.0204).  
We also control for the outgoing don’s talent because a highly talented don may value a 
highly  talented  successor  more  highly.  We  therefore  construct  an  imperial university education 
dummy for the outgoing don in a manner similar to that described above. Also, as the old don ages, 
his  abilities  may wane  and  pressure  to  step  aside  may grow.  The  don  cannot  readily  alter  his 
biological aging process, so we also include the logarithm of his age as a control variable. Ceteris 
paribus, we expect that older dons are more likely to abdicate the top job.  
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
Our  fist  stage  estimation  reveals  the  three  instrumental  variables  to  be  highly  jointly 
correlated with the actual succession outcomes, and possess the predicted signs. For e.g., the sign of 
the first instrument variable, the presence of a blood son, is positive and significant in [15] for 
blood heir, sarariman and sell-out choices (non-blood heir as the default benchmark category), 
indicating that adopted heirs are less likely when the don has a blood son. Similarly, the second 
                                                 
32   Hitotsubashi, though not officially designated an imperial university, uses similar entrance tests, and is 
widely regarded as an elite top-tier university; see e.g., Kerbo and McKinstry (1995, p. 140), who count 
Hitotsubashi among the three most prestigious universities). We therefore include Hitotsubashi among 
imperial universities.  
33   For e.g., Waseda Junior–Senior High School’s website (www.waseda-h.ed.jp/Overview/index_e.html) 
advertises that the “school is affiliated with Waseda University and about 50% of the graduates of high school 
are recommended to Waseda University. Others take entrance examinations and are admitted to the 
universities of their choice, such as the University of Tokyo, Kyoto University, Keio University, Tokyo Medical 
University and so on.”   22 
instrument, the presence of family on the board of the firm, also has a positive and significant 
coefficient, consistent with the argument presented earlier, though it is only significant for the 
blood  heir  choice.  Finally,  the  third  instrument,  the  cultural  leanings  of  the  old  don  vis-à-vis 
adoptions, has a negative and significant coefficient for all three choices, again indicating that an 
adopted heir choice is more likely when the firm has a culture of adoptions in its history. Overall the 
1st  stage  model  has  a  good  fit,  with  an  R-square  of  0.5176.  A  Hausman  test  (Nakamura  and 
Nakamura  1981)  rejects  the  instruments’  joint  insignificance  (  =  502.3,  p  <  0.0000)  at  a 
confidence level well below the standard threshold for weak instruments tests (Stock et al. 2002).34 
  The second stage results are presented Table 9, and for brevity, we have presented only the 
coefficients  on  the  successor  types  with  different  default  benchmarks  to  facilitate  pair-wise 
comparisons across successor types. For e.g., the first panel compares non-blood heirs to the other 
three successor types, and reiterates that non-blood heir successions induce significantly larger 
ROA gains than do blood heirs or sarariman successions. The point estimates show cashing out to 
be worse than a non-blood heir, but better than a blood heir or  sarariman; however none are 
statistically significant. A blood heir is marginally superior to sarariman (p = 0.06) in ROA gain.  
  The Q ratios show no significant differences across succession types. This may reflect the 
more forward-looking nature of valuation-based performance estimates. Once a family succession 
is locked in, an efficient market should discount share prices to reflect the expected impact of the 
likely succession event, and this tells against the power of average Q ratios in Table 9.  
  Table 9 ties non-blood heir successions to both enhanced ROA and enhanced employment 
growth – inconsistent with adopted heir successors trading-off financial performance for growth as 
conflicting  corporate  objectives.  Cash  out successions,  where  the  family  exits  the  firm  entirely, 
presage  higher  sales  growth  than  do  blood-heir  successions,  though  employment  growth  is  a 
statistical tie for the two groups. In the next section, we describe additional robustness checks to 
establish the significance of results disused earlier.  
  
4.4  Robustness checks 
The results in the tables above survive a battery of robustness checks.35 In describing these, we say 
the robustness check generates qualitatively similar results if the pattern of signs, significance levels, 
and rough coefficient magnitudes is identical to that shown in the corresponding tables.  
  Our original results, both panel and event tests, were based on data winsorized at 1%.  We 
repeat both tests using un-winsorized data, and find that qualitatively similar results ensue. In 
particular, founders and non-blood heirs continue to out-perform blood heirs, sarariman, and non-
don firms, and transitions to non-blood heirs are followed by superior performance improvements 
vis-à-vis other successor groups.  
  Our standard errors adjust for heteroscedasticity and are clustered by firm to account for 
the persistence of firms’ data within our panel, and for more than one succession event per firm in 
our causality analysis. Using simple pooled OLS standard errors greatly magnifies our t-ratios, and 
renders virtually all coefficients in all the tables statistically significant. Not clustering by firm also 
magnifies t-ratios in our causality study, and some differences that are insignificant in Table 8 and 
Table  9  attain  statistical  significance.  In  particular,  sarariman  successions  induce  lower 
performance  in  terms  of  accounting  profit  than blood  heirs.  In  fact,  sarariman  successions  are 
associated with the lowest performance among the four types of successors.  
  We pool sons-in-law and adopted sons, who are also sons-in-law, together and call these 
                                                 
34   We do not tabulate the 1st stage coefficient estimates to conserve space, but will be happy to provide these 
to the reader upon request. Second stage estimates are provided for the successor type in table 9 for different 
control groups, though other control variables are suppressed.  
35   The following robustness checks are not shown in tables, but are all available from the authors. 
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non-blood  heirs.  However,  the  two  subgroups  might  have  different  performance  effects.  We 
therefore  rerun  all  our  regressions  treating  these  as  separate  classes  of  family  firms.  We  find 
formally  adopted sons-in-law  outperforming  blood  heirs  in  terms  of  accounting  profit  rates  by 
0.61% - a magnitude greater than that by which all non-blood heir firms outperform blood heir 
firms; but the p-level (p = 0.11) now falls below standard thresholds of statistical significance. 
Formally adopted sons’ firms outperform other sons’-in-laws’ firms by 0.125% in ROA, 0.038 in Qs, 
and 0.31% in labor force growth, and lag behind by 0.048% in sales growth; but none of these 
coefficients is statistically significant. Formally adopted sons-in-law and other sons-in-law have 
similar  median  tenures  as  CEO  –  19  and  17  years,  respectively.  Overall,  the  data  suggest  that 
formally adopted sons-in-law and other sons-in-law are qualitatively similar – both to each other 
and compared to other successor types. This supports treating them as one group.  
  Our sample includes four female dons. Closer inspection reveals these to all be spouses of 
previous dons. In the tables, we consider these to be dons in their own right. However, their mean 
tenure is only six years, and two are explicitly minding the shop for husbands entering politics. Our 
female dons might thus be serving as placeholder CEOs. We therefore drop these four cases and 
rerun all our regressions. Qualitatively similar results ensue.  
We  exclude  successions  to  interim  sarariman  CEOs  who  are  succeeded  by  a  blood  or 
adopted heir. Rerunning our tests including these placeholders as bona fide sarariman successions 
yields almost identical patterns of signs and significance levels to those shown in the table. The p-
level for the Q-ratio difference between blood sons and ALL sarariman deteriorates from 0.03 to 
0.14,  and  that  between  non-blood  heirs  and  sarariman  deteriorates  from  0.03  to  0.09.  Other 
significance levels are not materially changed.  
Repeating  these  tests  with  interim  sarariman  as  a  separate  category  materially  alters 
neither the key coefficients nor their significance levels in the panel and the event study tests.  In 
the panel tests, interim sarariman firms outperform non-don firms in Q-ratios (p-value=0.01) and 
Labor Growth (p-value=0.05), whereas regular sarariman firmsare statistically indistinguishable 
from non-don firms across all performance metrics.  Adopted son firms continue to outperform 
regular  sarariman  firms  in  ROA  and  Q,  but  are  statistically  indistinguishable  from  interim 
sarariman firms across all performance measures. Blood heir firms outperform regular sarariman 
firms in Q-ratios and labor growth, but are statistically indistinguishable from interims across all 
performance measures. Finally, interims outperform regular sarariman firms in Q-ratios and labor 
growth.  These results are consistent with our thesis that interim sarariman CEOs are placeholders, 
and deliver performance similar to that of heirs, from whom they may well take directions.  Regular 
sarariman firm’s performance again lags that of heir firms. 
Finally, we split the interim sarariman CEOs into two groups, those with job tenures longer 
than the median (25th percentile), and those with shorter tenures.  We do this because long-serving 
interim sarariman may well become more similar to regular sarariman.  Again, all results retain 
signs and significances levels, except that the p-value for the Q-ratio difference between blood sons 
and sarariman deteriorates from 0.02 to 0.12 (0.14).   
  Throughout the tables, we define ROA as operating income divided by replacement cost, the 
denominator from our average Q measure. If we instead define ROA as operating income over the 
book value of assets, qualitatively similar results ensue throughout.  
  We define sales growth as the logarithm of the firm’s current year nominal sales less the 
logarithm of its sales one year earlier. Inflation was very low throughout our sample period, but we 
nonetheless repeat our tests using real sales, deflated using the GDP deflator, and find qualitatively 
similar results. We also repeat all our tests with 3 and 5-year sales growth rates, and again find 
qualitatively  similar  results.  Using  the  logarithm  of  current  employees  less  the  logarithm  of 
employees three and five years earlier to measure labor force growth likewise yields qualitatively 
similar results to those in the tables.  
  In  the  tables,  leverage  is  long-term  debt  scaled  by  estimated  replacement  cost.  As   24 
robustness  checks,  we  redefine  leverage  with  total  debt,  rather  than  long  term  debt,  in  the 
numerator;  with  unadjusted  book  value  of  assets  in  the  denominator;  and  with  both  changes. 
Qualitatively similar results ensue in all three cases.  
  We also repeat our tests using alternative definitions of family control. If we redefine family 
firms as only those whose founding family is the largest equity blockholder, founder and non-blood 
heir firms again outperform non-don firms in ROA and valuation, and founder and blood-heir firms 
again outdo non-don firms in sales and employee growth rates. If we redefine family firms as those 
whose founding family owns at least a 10% equity block, qualitatively similar results ensue.  
  Another possibility is that some founders may be disinclined to pass on the reins to family 
firms. We therefore define Bill Gates founders as those whose founder’s relatives do not ascend to 
the CEO job after the founder steps down. We find no statistically significant difference between 
firms  run  by  Bill  Gates  type  founders  and  other  founders.  Both  subsets  of  founder  firms  out-
perform firms run by blood-heirs and non-don firms; but neither significantly out-performs non-
blood heir firms - as in the tables. Thus, founders’ firms exhibit superior performance regardless of 
their discernable succession preferences.  
  We investigate whether our main panel results are driven by particular episodes in the 
sampling period, such as the 1980s “bubble economy” or the 1990s “lost decade”. The superiority of 
adopted heirs, biological heirs, and founders, persists in each decade of our sampling period (that is, 
the 1970s, the 1980s, and the 1990s.) in both ROA and Q dimensions. However, ROA superiority 
under blood heirs is driven mainly by the 1980s, and is statistically insignificant in other decades.  
We also perform a battery of robustness checks specifically on our causality analysis. First, 
Table 9 uses the old don’s degree attainment from an imperial university as a proxy for his talent. 
We sustitute an alternative proxy for the old don’s talent, the average annual ROA of the firm under 
the don’s watch excluding the five years immediately prior to the succession event, as a control. 
Performance thus defined is arguably sufficiently far removed from the succession event to avoid 
any immediate influence on the succession process, and in any case ought not to directly affect the 
change in performance following the succession event. Re-estimating the two stage procedure in 
Table 9 with this alternative proxy for the old don’s talent yields results qualitatively similar to 
those presented in the table. Using both measures of the old don’s talent in concert also yields 
qualitatively similar results.  
Our instrument for the don’s family ties is the presence of blood relations on the firm’s 
board at the time of the IPO. While this is reasonable in light of the 25 year mean gap (median=26 
years)  between  the  IPO  and  the  succession  event,  we  re-estimate  Table  9  dropping  the  14 
succession that follow the IPO by five years or less. Again, qualitatively similar results ensue.  
Tables 8 and 9 measure performance gains by average performance in the two years after 
the succession less average performance in the two years before the succession. If we use three 
years  averages  after  and  before,  significance  levels  weaken  somewhat,  but  the  patterns  of 
coefficient magnitudes and signs remain unchanged. The ROA differences between blood heirs and 
non-blood heirs remain significant, as do those between non-blood heirs and sarariman; and the p- 
level for the employee growth rate difference between blood heirs and non-blood heirs rises to 0.08, 
Overall, differences in three-year average pre and post-succession performance measures tell very 
similar stories to those in the tables.  
We also consider the possibility that adopted heirs gain higher performance by taking more 
risk.  We  examine  this  possibility  by  comparing  the  standard  deviation  of  each  of  the  four 
performance measures (ROA, Q, Sales growth and Employment growth) using the current year and 
the prospective four years of performance under the watch of adopted heirs with each of the other 
control groups. We find that – with one exception – none of the realized performance measures 
display a higher standard deviation under the watch of adopted heirs vis-à-vis any of the other 
control  groups.  The  exception  is  the  higher  standard  deviation  of  Q-ratios  under  the  watch  of 
adopted heirs relative to non-family firms as a group (p-value of difference=0.006). Indeed, other   25 
groups  actually  have  a  higher  point  estimate  of  realized  risk  measures,  with  the  difference  in 
standard deviation of ROA and Sales Growth under sarariman vs. adopted heirs being significant (p-
values=0.000 and 0.003 respectively), and the difference in the standard deviation of Sales Growth, 
Employment  Growth  and  Q-ratios  between  Founders  and  Adopted  Heirs  being  significant  (p-
values=0.025, 0.004, and 0.002 respectively).  
We also compare the change in the variance of performance measures for adopted sons 
following succession events. First we measure the change in the variance of performance measures 
from before (based on years –5 through –1) to after (based on years +1 through +5) the succession 
event anointing the adopted heir as CEO. We then estimate the same change for successors from 
other control groups. Finally, we compare the change in the variance of performance measures for 
adopted-heir successors with other successors. We find that when adopted sons succeed as CEOs, 
the change in the variance of ROA is significantly higher than that of blood-heir successors (p-
value<0.05).  Variance  changes  following  succession  events  for  the  other  three  performance 
measure  –  Q-ratios,  sales  growth,  and  employment  growth  –  are  not  significantly  different  for 
adopted-heir successors vs. blood-heir successors. Similarly, comparing adopted-heir successors to 
sarariman  successors,  and  to  selling  out,  we  do  not  find  that  performance  changes  display  a 
significantly higher variance for any of the four performance measures. Overall we interpret these 
results  as  being  inconsistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  adopted  heirs  might  achieve  better 
performance by taking more risk than other sorts of CEOs do.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
Inherited family firms are a more important part of the postwar Japanese economy than is generally 
realized. In 2000, roughly a third of our sample (firms that listed in years up to 1970) were run by 
their founders’ heirs or had his heirs as major equity blockholders. We also find that family firms 
tend to stay in the family – over 85% of intergenerational transitions preserve family control.  
  This is puzzling, for Burkart et al. (2003) model inherited family control prevailing where 
private benefits of control exceed the benefits of diversification. Even if the families’ private benefits 
of  control  are  primarily  non-pecuniary  (Demsetz  and  Lehn  1985),  block  and  voting  premiums 
should reveal the value families implicitly ascribe to these benefits. Yet international comparisons 
using block and voting premiums to infer the sum of pecuniary and nonpecuniary private benefits 
of control show these to be meager in Japan (Dyck and Zingales 2004; Nenova 2003).  
  Without private benefits, family control should be unsustainable in a competitive economy 
for  three  fundamental  reasons.  First,  intelligence  is  at  most  only  partially  and  undependably 
inherited (Herrnstein and Murray 1994; Heckman 1995; Devlin et al. 1997), and business talent is 
plausibly  a  dimension  of  intelligence  (Thorndike  1920;  Payne  1983;  Gardner  2007),  perhaps 
complementing  general  intelligence  (Cote  and  Miners  2006).  Second,  the  Carnegie  (1899) 
conjecture that immense inherited wealth deadens talent finds empirical support (Holtz-Eakin et al. 
1993). Third, reserving the top job for family precludes open CEO tournaments, which Lazear and 
Rosen  (1981),  Demsetz  (1996),  Frank  and  Cook  (1996),  and  others  show  highly  effective  at 
wringing effort from executives throughout the firm.  
  This  threefold  competitive  disadvantage  readily  explains  the  subpar  performance  of 
inherited family firms in the U.S. (Morck et al. 1988; Perez-Gonzalez 2006; Villalonga and Amit 
2006; Miller et al. 2007), Canada (Morck et al. 2000), Denmark (Bennedsen et al. 2007), and other 
countries (Bertrand and Schoar 2006); and the rapid diminution of family equity blocks observed in 
the United Kingdom (Franks et al. 2004).  
  Yet we find Japanese family firms puzzlingly competitive. They outperform professionally 
managed  firms  in  both profitability  and  in  market  valuation  (as  measured  by  Tobin’s  Q).  Most 
importantly, all these results exclude firms run by their founders from the family firm category. 
Family firms also display higher growth in sales and employees, suggesting they are not maximizing   26 
profits at the expense of non-financial objectives, such as market share or employment, which Aoki 
(1990), Porter (1990), and others argue to be more important in Japan than elsewhere. However, 
analogous results for sales growth changes do not emerge from the succession event studies. We 
thus have scant evidence that non-financial objective differ in importance across firm types.  
  Japan thus appears to resemble developing economies, where Khanna and Rivkin (2001) 
report old-moneyed family firms to be stars across many performance dimensions. They link this to 
the importance of business families’ reputations and connections in countries where corruption is 
prevalent  and formal institutions  are  weak  (Faccio  2006;  Morck  and  Yeung  2003;  Fogel  2007), 
arguing that family control confers genuine economic efficiency benefits in these environments. Yet 
Japan scores very low on international surveys on corruption and its institutions are strong (La 
Porta et al. 1997). Corruption scandals and institutional flaws appear from time to time in Japan, 
but not clearly more often than in the United States or United Kingdom. Moreover, professional 
networking is intense in Japan (Gerlach 1997), so family ties should be correspondingly devalued. 
Thus, although we cannot categorically rule out “connections” as underlying Japanese family firms’ 
admirable performance, we concede that this is implausible.  
  We trace the relative success of family firms in Japan to a unique custom of incorporating 
fresh blood into the family via adult adoptions, many of which also entail an arranged marriage into 
the controlling family.  Adopting highly qualified adults to head family businesses has the  triple 
effect of displacing untalented blood heirs, eliciting effort from professional managers who might be 
“promoted” to adopted son, and eliciting effort from blood heirs who live under an ever present 
threat of being replaced by a “better” adopted son. Consistent with this logic, we find a broad body 
of evidence showing family firms run by adopted heirs outperforming family firms run by blood 
heirs, and further showing adopted and blood heir managed firms both outperforming both family 
firms run by professional sarariman CEOs and non-family firms.  
As in other corporate governance settings, such as hostile takeovers, the threat matters 
more than the caning. During the height of the US hostile takeover wave in the 1980s, only one in 
ten takeovers was manifestly hostile, with the target board advising shareholders not to tender 
(Morck,  Shleifer  and  Vishny  1988a).  Yet  the  threat  of  a  hostile  takeover  was  thought  to  elicit 
economically significant greater effort from CEOs across the board (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Only 
one in ten successions in our sample are to non-blood heirs. Perhaps, as in Voltaire's (1759) Candide, 
where "'it is good, from time to time, to kill an admiral, to encourage the others,” a low probability 
threat can be effective if the penalty is sufficiently large.36  
  Our findings suggest that the unexpectedly high incidence and prosperity of old-moneyed 
family  firms in  Japan need  not  disturb  the  generality  of  a  key  premise  of  the  business  history 
literature: that professionalization raises firm efficiency (Landes 1949; Chandler 1977). While Japan 
is  much  less  unique  than  often  portrayed  (Beason  and  Patterson  2006),  the  practice  of  adult 
adoptions into business families seems genuinely exceptional. This practice, and the incentives it 
creates for both professional managers and potential heirs, plausibly renders Japanese family firms 
more professionally managed than their peers elsewhere, in that star professionals occupy the top 
job, and thus perhaps also arguably render them not genuine family firms. Even without adult 
adoptions, carefully selected sons-in-law might have similar effects. This suggests that family firms 
might  better  prosper  where  arranged  marriages  are  more  socially  acceptable,  consistent  with 
evidence presented by Mehrotra et al. (2009).  
  Finally, superior performance in firms run by non-blood heirs, likely selected for talent, 
argues that “CEOs matter” (Bertrand & Schoar 2003); Bennedsen et al. 2010); that successful CEOs 
possess  valuable  talent  –  e.g.  creativity  (Schumpeter  1911),  rationality  (Knight  1921,  c.  9),  or 
foresight (Hayek (1941, 334); and the general existence of “leader effects” (Jones and Olken 2005).    
                                                 
36   “il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres”, Voltaire (1759)   27 
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Table 1: Adoption Statistics 
Special adoptions, explicitly modelled on the foreign practice of finding homes for orphans and 
mistreated or unwanted children, are a recent innovation. Ordinary adoptions, in contrast, are a 
deeply rooted Japanese tradition, in which parents needing an heir adopt a child or adult.  





Total adoptions of adults
yôshi engumi tokubetsu yôshi miseinen yôshi
1955 101,963 0 26,983 26,983 74,980
1965 82,176 0 15,018 15,018 67,158
1975 86,844 0 6,771 6,771 80,073
1985 91,186 0 2,804 2,804 88,382
1990 82,007 738 1,502 2,240 79,767
1995 79,381 521 1,111 1,632 77,749
2000 80,790 362 994 1,356 79,434
2002 85,674 350 960 1,310 84,364
2004 83,505 332 998 1,330 82,175
Sources:Tokubetsu yôshiand Child Adoptions Approved by the Court:Supreme Court ofJapan. shihôtôkeinenpô Kajihen are fromissues ofthe
Annual Report ofJudicial Statistics (Table 3 ofVolume 3, Family Cases). Adoptions registered by Kosekioffices are from issues of the Ministry
of Justice Annual report (Hômu nenkan).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Main Variables 
ROA  is  the  ratio  of  operating  income  to  adjusted  total  assets.  Q-ratios  is  market  value  over 
replacement cost, with market value defined as replacement cost less book value of equity plus 
market value of equity; and replacement cost defined as assets adjusted by marking real estate and 
equity cross holdings to market. Sales and employee growth statistics are based on year to year 
percentage growth. Industry-adjustment is based on subtracting the median value for the matching 
two-digit Japanese exchange industry code firms, excluding the sample firm. Total assets are in 
billions of yen; leverage is long-term debt over replacement cost; capital expenditure is year-on-
year change in fixed assets plus depreciation over lagged sales; and firm age is years since founding. 
Total  sample  size  is  49,638  firm-year  observations,  containing  firms  listed  on  Japanese  stock 
exchanges between 1949 and 1970. The data cover fiscal years spanning 1962 trough 2000. 




ROA 4.60% 3.92% 30.36% -18.97% 4.50%
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.65% -0.94% 25.99% -22.83% 3.89%
Q 1.40 1.28 5.79 0.29 0.42
Industry-adjusted Q -6.13% -10.31% 381.28% -197.74% 36.81%
Sales growth 8.02% 6.15% 114.77% -70.28% 16.02%
Industry-adjusted sales growth -0.73% -1.26% 116.82% -87.61% 13.10%
Employee growth -0.34% -0.48% 58.98% -65.44% 8.12%
Industry-adjusted employee growth -0.61% -0.49% 111.17% -90.16% 9.03%
Other Firm Characteristics
Total assets (billion ￥) 189.00 32.40 16100.00 0.17 668.00
Leverage 11.86% 9.54% 67.02% 0.00% 10.60%
Capital expenditure 3.41% 1.60% 124.15% -116.91% 9.51%
Firm age 44.9 44.0 110.0 4.0 18.3  34 
Table 3: Firm performance and characteristics 
Don firms’  founders’  families  are  either  a  top  10  equity  blockholder,  or  serve  as  President  or 
Chairman. Founder firms are don firms by dint of their founders’ equity block or top management 
position. Heir-managed firms are family firms by dint of the equity block or management position of 
a member of their founding family other than the founder. In blood heir firms, this is a biological 
descendent of the founder; in non-blood heir firms, this is an adopted son or son-in-law. Other 
variables are as defined in Table 2. 
Founder firms All Blood heirs Non-blood heirs Sarariman
Performance 
ROA 7.12% 4.64% 4.57% 5.79% 3.75% 4.24%
Industry-adjusted ROA 0.69% -0.46% -0.49% 0.19% -1.03% -0.91%
Q 1.46 1.43 1.43 1.46 1.40 1.37
Industry-adjusted Q 4.35% -3.25% -2.79% 1.24% -10.29% -8.93%
Sales growth 14.72% 7.62% 7.61% 9.63% 5.55% 7.28%
Industry-adjusted sales growth 1.82% -0.75% -0.69% -0.33% -1.48% -1.06%
Employee growth 2.42% -0.23% -0.13% 0.31% -1.31% -0.75%
Industry-adjusted employee growth 1.06% -0.60% -0.48% -0.45% -1.35% -0.84%
Other Firm Characteristics
Total assets (billion ￥) 58.2 120 114 164 106 237
Leverage 10.40% 9.47% 9.44% 9.49% 9.60% 13.11%
Firm age 29.2 45.5 46.1 43.4 45.2 46.7
Family ownership, % 16.3 12.6 13.1 15.7 7.4 0.0
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Table 4: Relative performance by control classification, ANOVA results 
Variables are as defined in Tables 2 and 3. T-tests adjust for industry and year fixed effects, and for 
firm-level  clustering  of  residuals.  Numbers  in  parentheses  are  p-levels  for  rejecting  the  null 
hypothesis of identical means. Boldface denotes significance at 5% or better.  
Benchmark Premium for ROA, % Q Sales growth,% Labour growth, %
Non-don firms Don firms 0.729 0.077 0.929 0.656
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Non-don firms Founders 1.465 0.127 2.826 1.761
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Blood heirs 0.478 0.067 0.463 0.474
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Non-blood heirs 1.066 0.095 0.504 0.284
(0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.27)
Sarariman 0.109 0.004 -0.210 -0.313
(0.64) (0.87) (0.54) (0.21)
Blood heirs Founders 0.987 0.060 2.363 1.287
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Non-blood heirs 0.588 0.028 0.041 -0.190
(0.03) (0.38) (0.91) (0.49)
Sarariman -0.369 -0.063 -0.673 -0.788
(0.14) (0.02) (0.07) (0.00)
Non-blood heirs Founders 0.398 0.032 2.322 1.477
(0.21) (0.33) (0.00) (0.00)
Sarariman -0.958 -0.090 -0.715 -0.597
(0.00) (0.02) (0.12) (0.09)
Sarariman Founders 1.356 0.122 3.037 2.075
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    36 
Table 5: Performance regressions, founder, family, and other firms 
Variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. Regressions are on firm-level panel data from 1962 through 
2000. Total observations equal 47,102 for Q-regressions and 49,638 firm-years for all others.  
ROA, % Q Sales growth,% Labour growth, %
Founder firms 1.130 0.108 2.422 1.441
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Family firms 0.375 0.050 0.357 0.304
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
Firm size 0.120 0.005 0.325 0.258
(0.00) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00)
Leverage -0.095 -0.009 -0.072 -0.068
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Capital expenditure 0.032 0.005 0.168 0.155
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm age -0.016 -0.000 -0.036 -0.025
(0.00) (0.87) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 7.360 1.878 5.087 1.771
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Adj. R squre 0.33 0.35 0.31 0.17
Number of firm clusters 1,367 1,289 1,367 1,367
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6: Performance and family control, regressions summary 
Variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. Regressions are on firm-level panel data from 1962 through 
2000, and include the control variables listed in Table 5. Total observations equal 47,102 for Q-
regressions and 49,638 firm-years for all others.  
Benchmark Premium for ROA, % Q Sales growth,% Labour growth, %
Non-don firms Don firms 0.540 0.062 0.809 0.552
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Non-don firms Founders 1.133 0.108 2.420 1.438
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Blood heirs 0.329 0.054 0.446 0.442
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Non-blood heirs 0.881 0.078 0.384 0.157
(0.00) (0.01) (0.21) (0.51)
Sarariman 0.051 -0.000 -0.111 -0.224
(0.83) (0.99) (0.74) (0.34)
Blood heirs Founders 0.804 0.055 1.974 0.996
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Non-blood heirs 0.551 0.024 -0.062 -0.284
(0.03) (0.43) (0.85) (0.27)
Sarariman -0.278 -0.054 -0.557 -0.665
(0.25) (0.03) (0.12) (0.01)
Non-blood heirs Founders 0.253 0.031 2.036 1.280
(0.41) (0.33) (0.00) (0.00)
Sarariman -0.829 -0.078 -0.495 -0.381
(0.01) (0.03) (0.25) (0.24)
Sarariman Founders 1.082 0.109 2.531 1.661
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    38 
Table 7: Succession Events 
Sample is all changes in control from 1962 to 2000 in all Japanese firms initially listed between 
1949 and 1970. This includes prewar firms that relisted when stock markets reopened in 1949. The 
imperial universities – Tokyo University, Kyoto University, and several others – and Hitotsubashi 
University admit solely on academic merit. Entrance to other universities is possible by attending 
expensive affiliated preparatory schools.  
Successor type Events Successor sub-type Events Imperial
242 blood heir is a merit university graduate 51 51
blood heir is not a merit university graduate 191 191
42 non-blood heir is legally adopted son and son-in-law 20 17
non-blood heir is son-in-law, but not legally adopted son 22 25
Sarariman 81 family retains top ten equity stake (sarariman-run family firm) 81
365
Cash out 60
Grand total 425 425
Blood heir
Non-blood heir
family not listed among top ten shareholders (non-don firm)
Subtotal of family firm successions
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Table 8: Performance changes around succession events 
Variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. Cross-section regressions are on event-level data. Events 
are  all  425  old  don  departures  from  1962  through  2000  for  which  control  variables  data  are 
complete, and are subdivided according to whether the successor is the old don’s blood heir, non-
blood  heir,  a  professional  manager  (sarariman)  running  a  firm  in  which  the  old  don’s  family 
remains a top ten blockholder, or a professional manager running a firm in which the family is no 
longer a top ten blockholder (cash out). Regressions control for firm age, firm size, leverage, capital 
spending, and succession year and industry fixed effects. Some firms have more than one succession 
event, so standard errors are clustered by firm.  
 
Benchmark Premium for ΔROA ΔQ ΔSales growth ΔLabor growth
Non-blood heir Blood heir  -0.0235 0.0333 -0.0784 -0.0228
(0.00) (0.47) (0.00) (0.10)
Sarariman  -0.0340 -0.0333 -0.0623 -0.0110
(0.00) (0.52) (0.02) (0.55)
Cash out -0.0182 0.0624 -0.0568 -0.0174
(0.02) (0.41) (0.04) (0.30)
Blood heir Sarariman  -0.0105 -0.0666 0.0162 0.0118
(0.03) (0.10) (0.41) (0.39)
Cash out  0.0053 0.0291 0.0217 0.0054
(0.33) (0.65) (0.25) (0.64)
Sarariman Cash out  0.0158 0.0957 0.0055 -0.0064
(0.01) (0.15) (0.82) (0.68)
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Table 9: Exogenous performance changes around succession events 
Variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. First stage regressions are multinomial logits of succession choices 
and are described in [15]. Second stage cross-section regressions are on event-level data and are described 
in [16]. Events are all 425 old don departures from 1962 through 2000 for which control variables data are 
complete, and are subdivided according to whether the successor is the old don’s blood heir, non-blood heir, 
a  professional  manager  (sarariman)  running  a  firm  in  which  the  old  don’s  family  remains  a  top  ten 
blockholder,  or  a  professional  manager  running  a  firm  in  which  the  family  is  no  longer  a  top  ten 
blockholder (cash out). Second stage regressions control for firm age, firm size, leverage, capital spending, 
and  succession  year  and  industry  fixed  effects.  Some  firms  have  more  than  one  succession  event,  so 
standard errors are clustered by firm.  
 
Benchmark Premium for ΔROA ΔQ ΔSales growth ΔLabor growth
Non-blood heir Blood heir  -0.0256 -0.0779 -0.1220 -0.0546
(0.00) (0.29) (0.00) (0.03)
Sarariman  -0.0434 -0.1219 -0.1417 -0.0861
(0.00) (0.26) (0.01) (0.02)
Cash out -0.0107 0.0087 -0.0040 -0.0297
(0.47) (0.95) (0.94) (0.37)
Blood heir Sarariman  -0.0178 -0.0440 -0.0197 -0.0315
(0.06) (0.57) (0.55) (0.13)
Cash out  0.0149 0.0867 0.1179 0.0248
(0.19) (0.43) (0.00) (0.25)
Sarariman Cash out  0.0327 0.1306 0.1376 0.0564
(0.03) (0.36) (0.01) (0.07)  
 
     41 
Figure 1 
 
The career of Osamu Matsuda from his graduation at Chuo University in 1953 through his adoption by 
Suzuki patriarch, Shunzou Suzuki, and simultaneous marriage to Shunzou’s eldest daughter in 1958 to his 
current position as CEO and Chairman of Suzuki and the patriarch of the Suzuki family.  
 
   
            Arranged          
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            1  st     daughter of       
            Shunzou Suzuki;    
Mr.   Osamu Matsuda            Joins                   
Graduates     from           Suzuki Motors;                
Chuo University;           Adopted into         Joins Board of        Promoted to    
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Age: 23             Age: 28          Age: 33          Age: 48    
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Figure 2: Prevalence of Founder and Family Controlled Firms: 1962 to 2000 
The graph includes all firms trading on Japanese stock exchanges between 1949 and 1970, for which accounting and governance data are 
available from 1962 through 2000 (or delisting). Family firms count a founding family member among their top 10 shareholders, directors 
empowered to sign for the firm, or as CEO. All other firms are non-don firms. Founder-run firms are family firms whose founder fills one or 
more of these criteria. All other family firms are heir-run. Among these, blood heir firms have a biological descendent of the founder and 
non-blood heir firms  an adopted son  or  son-in-law  filling  one  of  these  roles.  A  sarariman firm’s  founding  families  remains  a  top 10 
shareholder, but provides neither a CEO nor a signing director, instead entrusting these positions to professional managers. Formerdon 
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